Children are notoriously bad at delaying gratification to achieve later, greater rewards (e.g., Piaget, 1970)-and some are worse at waiting than others. Individual differences in the ability-to-wait have been attributed to self-control, in part because of evidence that long-delayers are more successful in later life (e.g., Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990). Here we provide evidence that, in addition to self-control, children's wait-times are modulated by an implicit, rational decision-making process that considers environmental reliability. We tested children (M = 4;6, N = 28) using a classic paradigm-the marshmallow task (Mischel, 1974)-in an environment demonstrated to be either unreliable or reliable. Children in the reliable condition waited significantly longer than those in the unreliable condition (p < 0.0005), suggesting that children's wait-times reflected reasoned beliefs about whether waiting would ultimately pay off. Thus, wait-times on sustained delay-of-gratification tasks (e.g., the marshmallow task) may not only reflect differences in self-control abilities, but also beliefs about the stability of the world.
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Introduction
When children draw on walls, reject daily baths, or leave the house wearing no pants and a tutu, caretakers may reasonably doubt their capacity for rational decision-making. However, recent evidence suggests that even very young children possess sophisticated decision-making capabilities for reasoning about physical causality (e.g., Gopnik et al., 2004; Gweon & Schulz, 2011) , social behavior (e.g., Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002), future events (e.g., Denison & Xu, 2010; Kidd, Piantadosi, & Aslin, 2012; Téglás et al., 2011) , concepts and categories (e.g., Piantadosi, Tenenbaum, & Goodman, 2012; Xu, Dewar, & Perfors, 2009) , and word meanings (e.g., Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007 ). Here we demonstrate that young children also use their rational decision-making abilities in a domain of behavioral inhibition: a sustained delay-of-gratification task.
Decision-making is said to be rational if it maximizes benefit or utility (Anderson, 1991; Anderson & Milson, 1989; Marr, 1982) , yet young children's decisions during delay-of-gratification tasks often appear to do just the opposite (e.g., Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970) . When asked to resist the temptation of an immediately available lowvalue reward to obtain one of high-value after a temporal delay, 75% of children failed to do so, succumbing to their desire after an average of 5.72 min. The cause of these apparent failures of rationality, however, is not fully understood. While children's failures to wait are likely the result of a combination of many genetic and environmental variables, two potentially important factors are self-control capacity and established beliefs.
